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Why America Lose The Vietnam War
In analyzing leadership within the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces prior to the final collapse in 1975, three characteristics of the top military leaders come into sharp focus: incompetence, passivity and corruption. This is not to say that these characteristics were exhibited by all of South Vietnam's military leaders nor that the required leadership to guide the RVNAF to success in 1975 was not available. Indeed, the brilliant resistance by the 18th ARVN Division at Xuan Loc, led by General Le Minh Dao, gives some evidence that good leaders did exist in South Vietnam in 1975; however, the system simply did not allow enough of them to surface in time and take charge in enough critical situations to have any significant impact on the final outcome of the war.1 In other words, South Vietnam ran out of time in 1975.
In any nation, the political role of its armed forces is critical, especially if the nation looks to its military leaders for political leadership as well. Under these conditions where the military forms the political base of government, the military can be susceptible to politicization. Such a system ensures its military leaders are chosen, promoted, and favored for political loyalty rather than professional military skill.2 Unfortunately for South Vietnam, this was the situation of the RVNAF top leadership in 1975.
In fact, after the November coup of 1963 when the military overthrew the Diem regime, military leadership in South Vietnam became intricately entwined with the political structure. The political instability which followed the 1963 coup adversely affected the performance of the South Vietnamese armed forces; this precipitated increased involvement by the United States in conducting military operations in South Vietnam by 1965. Although the Thieu government succeeded in bringing some semblance of stability to the government of South Vietnam, the corruption and politicized promotion system remained. General Cao Van Vien was highly critical of military leadership within the Republic of Vietnam's armed forces, and he had this to say about it:
Of the flaws and vulnerabilities that military leadership in the RVNAF might have demonstrated, the most detrimental were perhaps political-mindedness and corruption. The November coup of 1963 had changed military leadership so completely that the RVNAF were never the same again. Its effect could still be felt even after elective democracy had been institutionalized. Politics had been so ingrained among senior commanders that it was impossible for them to relinquish it and return to military professionalism. The Thieu regime, in fact, feared not so much the enemy from the outside as those who had once been partners and comrade-in-arms. And that explained why, one by one, the politically ambitious ones had to go, but potential rivalry still persisted.3